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Building Blocks in the Economics of Mandates 
 
The paper constructs an asymmetric information model to investigate the efficiency and 
equity cases for government mandated benefits. A mandate can improve workers' insurance, 
and may also redistribute in favour of more "deserving" workers. The risk is that it may also 
reduce output. The more diverse are free market contracts – separating the various worker 
types – the more likely it is that such output effects will on balance serve to reduce welfare. It 
is shown that adverse effects can be reduced by restricting mandates to larger firms. An 
alternative to a mandate is direct government provision. We demonstrate that direct 
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In recent years, the case for government regulation of labour markets has been supplemented 
by a new literature that exploits asymmetric information. Thus, Summers (1989, 179) has 
argued that government mandates requiring firms to provide benefits can bring about an 
improvement in welfare in circumstances in which company schemes would be overwhelmed 
by adverse selection stemming from workers' or firms' private information.  
  Summers sees adverse selection as relevant specifically to the fringe benefits of health 
insurance, parental leave, and dismissals protection. In each of these cases, the worker may 
suffer some unforeseen contingency and the employer then provide a "wage", or "benefit", 
not matched by work done. This may be an insurance payout (health insurance); or an 
insurance payout and a guarantee of the job on return to work (parental leave); or the job and 
a wage when the employer's ability to fire at will is restricted (dismissals protection). And in 
each case, adverse selection due to asymmetric information may discourage firms from 
providing the fringe benefit. In the ensuing labour literature, Levine (1991) on dismissals 
protection, Ruhm (1998) on parental leave, and Encinosa (1999) on health insurance develop 
the point. Krueger (2000, 119) also points to the importance of adverse selection problems as 
a rationale for government mandates. Aghion and Hermalin (1989) is another progenitor of 
the basic idea. 
  The labour market literature is closely related to a more general and more developed 
literature on adverse selection in insurance markets, for which the seminal work is by 
Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) and Wilson (1977). This general insurance market literature 
finds that the problem of adverse selection is reduced if insurance companies can offer loss-
making contracts subsidised by profit-making contracts (Cave, 1984; Stewart, 1994); or again  
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if in a multiperiod framework insurance companies can use loss experience to reclassify 
policy holders (Dione and Lasserre, 1987; Cooper and Hayes, 1987). However, we have not 
thought it appropriate to incorporate these refinements. They imply that a firm routinely 
offers its workers a rich and varied menu of contracts. Such menus would embrace differing 
levels of health insurance, parental leave, dismissals protection, and so on, and they are not 
observed in practice. Indeed, as well as their complexity, adopting a variety of standards for a 
fringe benefit would typically conflict with "norms of fairness" (Levine, 1991, 296), and also 
confront legal constraints. 
  The discussion of labour market mandates has mostly proceeded informally. 
However, Summers (1989, 182) has called for more formal analysis, the provision of which 
is a principal task of our paper. The model we build for this purpose is in direct line of 
descent from Wilson (1977). We follow Hellwig's (1987) game theoretic development of 
Wilson, translating the model to a labour market context that is richer than the original in 
view of its technological complexity. We also make central the issue of the role of 
government. 
  The question at issue is: can government by mandating labour market benefits 
increase welfare? In our simple model, where firms are distinguished only by product, in both 
the separating and pooling cases, a mandate can achieve efficient allocation of income across 
states (i.e. secure "full insurance"), accompanied by a redistribution of income among 
workers. In some instances, this redistribution appears equitable – it favours "deserving" 
workers. In this way, both the Summers (1989) case and the redistributive case for mandates 
is formalised. However, in our general model, with firms differentiated in more important 
ways, the mandate is shown to reduce output in the separating case. This is because, whereas  
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the free market exploits separation to match worker types efficiently to firms, a mandate 
imposes pooling and substitutes a random allocation of workers to firms. Whenever a sorting 
mechanism based on separation exists, it is necessarily eliminated by the imposition of a 
mandate. In our model, then, a mandate imposing dismissals protection, for example, does 
not simply affect the economy's pattern of adjustment to shocks, but may reduce productivity 
directly by causing worker misallocation.
1 In the separating case, a mandate could thus cause 
a loss of productive efficiency, making it less likely that the mandate is desirable. 
  One may be able to get round such misallocation when, for example, heterogeneity 
derives from a distinction between "small" and "large" firms, and where the government is 
able to target large firms. We show that, in a likely scenario, such a "restricted" mandate can 
short-circuit adverse effects on labour allocation, thereby providing a case for restricting 
mandates to large firms. It is clear though that the general problem of firm heterogeneity 
remains. 
  Summers (1989) also discusses the advantages of the mandate over direct government 
provision of the benefit in terms of its not distorting prices. We can, however, point to an 
advantage of direct government provision. Direct government provision of the benefit can 
help to preserve separation, and so avoid the mandate's adverse effects on labour allocation. 
The outline of the paper is as follows. Section II develops the asymmetric information 
model and analyses the case of (essentially) homogeneous firms. The scope for achieving 
welfare improvements within this framework is examined in Section III. The effects of 
introducing firm heterogeneity are discussed in Section IV. Section V tackles the issue of 
government provision as an alternative to mandates. Section VI concludes. 
                     




II. The  Model 
There are two types of firm, each type producing a different good, and two types of worker 
(as defined below). Many firms of each type and many workers of each type play a 3-stage 
game. In stage 1, each firm offers a contract; in stage 2, each worker accepts one of the 
contracts on offer; and in stage 3, a firm may if it wishes withdraw the contract offered in 
stage 1. (Allowing firms to withdraw contracts is consistent with the notion of long-run 
competitive behaviour. It also ensures that the game has a solution: see Hellwig, 1987.) There 
are two states of nature for each worker. After completion of the game's three stages, the state 
of nature is in each case realised and firms and workers receive their payoffs. 
  The two states of nature correspond to "success" or "failure" on the part of the 
worker, where for example a worker may fail because of ill health, maternity leave, or an 
inability to cope with the job. The effect is that a worker's product is less in the "bad" state 
(failure) than the "good" state (success). 
  A worker has a continuously differentiable Neumann-Morgenstern utility function, 
U(.) (the same for all workers), that is separable in income and prices. Thus, fixing the 
general level of prices (defined appropriately), the worker's utility depends, ex ante, only on 
the probability of failure and the income received in the different states. Suppose that if a 
worker accepts a contract (b,w), U=UF(b) if the bad state occurs and U=US(w) in the good 
state. That is, ex post, utility is state-dependent. Further, suppose that workers are risk averse 
and worker types distinguished by the probability of failure, PL for "low-risk" types and PH 
for "high-risk" types (PL<PH).  
                                                                
mechanism, obtains in the model of Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993).  
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  Labour is the only factor of production and each good is produced under constant 
returns. For concreteness, call the two firm types "large" firms and "small" firms, even 
though strictly within the terms of the model, for simplicity, the size of firms is 
indeterminate. A worker’s product is one unit in the good state, e units in the bad state if 
employed by a large firm (e<1), and em units in the bad state if employed by a small firm 
(em<1). Intuitively, the dependence on type of firm is because the failure of a worker may 
cause greater difficulties for some types than others. For example, we would argue that 
absence through illness is more disruptive in small firms than in large firms, where it is easier 
to arrange cover for absence.
2
  Firms are competitive and risk neutral: competition in the markets for goods and 
labour drives their expected profits – revenue minus wages – to zero. Let S and Sm be the 
prices of the goods produced by large and small firms, respectively. Then, for large firms 
revenue per worker is S in the good state and F=eS<S in the bad state; for small firms it is Sm 
in the good state and Fm=emSm<Sm in the bad state. 
  Assume to start with that e=em, so that Sm=S and Fm=F. (If, say, S>Sm and so F>Fm, 
then workers would do better moving from small to large firms.) Thus we deal first with the 
case of (essentially) homogeneous firms – the same contracts on offer in the two sectors, 
workers indifferent between sectors, and supply adjusting to equate prices. 
Consider any firm. According to the terms of a contract, the firm pays wages b in the 
bad state and w in the good state. Thus a contract is a pair of values, (b,w), where b may 
                     
2 The OECD (1995, 190) surveys parental leave in 19 countries, and states that the absence of a key worker 
for a long period creates difficulties for small firms. This explains the exemption, for example, of firms 
employing less than 50 workers from the provisions of the 1993 U.S. Family and Medical Leave Act.  
 
  7
include a "benefit". Define this benefit as b-F – a benefit is paid if the wage in the bad state is 
greater than the worker's revenue product. Assuming the benefit cannot be negative, we have 
b≥F. In addition, however, a higher minimum level for b – fixed either in absolute terms or as 
a proportion of w – can be mandated by the government. (The government could also provide 
the benefit directly; this issue is taken up in Section V.) 
  Recall that the probability of failure is PL for a "low-risk" type and PH for a "high-
risk" type. The corresponding "odds ratios" are QL=PL/(1-PL) and QH=PH/(1-PH). Thus, the 
slope of an indifference curve is, for a low-risk type, 
(1)                   dw/db = - QLUF′/US′ 
and, for a high-risk type, 
(2)                   dw/db = - QHUF′/US′. 
As QL<QH, at any point in (b,w) space the low-risk worker's indifference curve is flatter than 
that of the high-risk worker – the "single crossing property" holds. In Figure 1, UL=UL* and 
UH=UH* (on which more below) are indifference curves of low-risk and high-risk workers, 
respectively. 
  (Figure 1 near here) 
  Three zero profit lines are also shown in Figure 1. Contracts for which the firm breaks 
even (on average) when employing a low-risk worker are described by 
(3)                       RL = PL(F-b) + (1-PL)(S-w) = 0. 
The corresponding zero profit line for a high-risk worker is 
(4)                       RH = PH(F-b) + (1-PH)(S-w) = 0. 
The "pooling line" is 
(5)                         R = P(F-b) + (1-P)(S-w) = 0,  
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where P=θPL+(1-θ)PH and θ is the proportion of low-risk workers. Thus the pooling line 
describes break-even contracts for randomly selected workers. Let the odds ratio 
corresponding to P be Q=P/(1-P). 
  The respective slopes of the three zero profit lines are -QL, -QH and -Q, where 
Q=P/(1-P) and QL<Q<QH. This means the pooling line has a slope which is steeper than 
RL=0 and flatter than RH=0. Since P approaches PL as θ→1, we have also the results that Q 
approaches QL and R=0 approaches RL=0, as θ→1. 
  The model is one of asymmetric information. Workers know their own type, but since 
this is private information firms cannot distinguish among workers. There are two possible 
solutions to this informed worker/ignorant firm model – a separating equilibrium and a 
pooling equilibrium. In describing these, it is helpful to define four special contracts, which 
we denote by EH, EL′, EL and E. 
  First, contract EH is the contract that maximises the high-risk type's utility, 
(6)             UH =  PHUF(b) + (1-PH)US(w), 
subject to RH=0 (equation (4)). EH is the best the high-risk worker can do, given that the firm 
knows the worker's type and breaks even. Let EH=(bH,wH). EH is characterised by
3
(7a)                UF′(bH) =  US′(wH) 
                     
    
3 The Lagrangean is 
 P HUF(b) + (1-PH)US(w) + λ[PH(F-b)+(1-PH)(S-w)]. 
Differentiating with respect to b and w and equating to zero, 
(F1)                  PHUF′(b) =  λPH
(F2)           (1-PH)US′(w) =  λ(1-PH). 
(7a) follows from (F1) and (F2). The constraint gives (7b).  
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(7b)             wH  = S - QH(bH-F). 
We denote by UH* the level of utility attained by the high-risk type at EH. 
  Second, and analogously, contract EL′ maximises the low-risk type's utility 
(8)             UL = PLUF(b) + (1-PL)US(w), 
subject to RL=0 (equation (3)). Let EL′=(bL′,wL′). Accordingly, EL′ is characterised by 
(9a)               UF′(bL′) = US′(wL′) 
(9b)            wL′ = S - QL(bL′-F). 
 E H and EL′ are the points where RH=0 and RL=0, respectively, intersect the "full 
insurance" line. Shown as the dashed line in Figure 1, the full insurance line is defined by 
UF′(b) =  US′(w), and its slope is 
(10)       dw/db = UF″/US″. 
Note that, in the case of state-independent utility, we have UF(.)=US(.) and the full insurance 
line becomes a 45-degree line through the worker origin O. 
  Because workers are assumed to be risk averse, both UF″ and US″ are negative and the 
full insurance line has a positive slope. To the left of the line, UF′(.)<US′(.); and to the right, 
UF′(.)>US′(.). We assume UF′(F)>US′(S), that is, workers are underinsured at the firm origin 
O′ where they are paid according to their productivity in the two states. 
 Given  QL<QH (flatter zero profit line associated with the low-risk worker), the full 
insurance line's positive slope implies bL′>bH and wL′>wH. Thus, wages are higher at EL′ than 
at EH in both good and bad states, and at EL′ we have UH>UH* (the high risk-type's utility at 
EH). 
  Third, consider the contract, EL, which comes into play when the firm does not know 
the worker's type. EL maximises the low-risk type's utility, UL, subject to RL=0 and UH ≤  
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UH*, the incentive compatibility condition. When the latter condition holds, high-risk types 
have no incentive to switch from contract EH to EL, and since UH>UH* at EL′ the condition is 
binding. It follows that EL is determined by the intersection of the indifference curve, 
UH=UH*, and the zero profit line, RL=0, and lies between EL′ and the firm origin, O′.
4 Let 
EL=(bL,wL). By equations (3) and (6), EL is characterised by 
(11a)           UH* =  PHUF(bL) + (1-PH)US(wL) 
(11b)             wL = S - QL(bL-F). 
We denote by UL* the level of utility attained by the low-risk type at EL. 
  Finally, E is the contract that maximises the low-risk type's utility, UL, subject to R=0, 
namely, the pooling line given by equation (5). Let E=(bP,wP). Using equation (8), and 
proceeding as in footnote 2, E is characterised by 
(12a)            QLUF′(bP) =  QUS′(wP) 
(12b)             wP = S - Q(bP-F). 
Since QL<Q, (12a) implies that UF′>US′ at E, and E lies on the pooling line to the right of the 
full insurance line. We will denote by UL** and UH**, respectively, the levels of utility 
attained by low-risk and high-risk types at E. 
 
4 We can show that UL declines to the right of EL′ on the line RL=0 (Figure 1). From equation (8), since 
RL=0 has slope -QL=-PL/(1-PL), 
(F3)        dUL/db =  PLUF′ + (1-PL)US′(dw/db) 
    =   P L(UF′-US′). 
As EL′ lies on the full insurance line, we know that, to the right of EL′, UF′>US′. Thus, by (F3), to the right 
of EL′, dUL/db>0, and UL declines as benefits are reduced. UH likewise declines to the right of EL′ on the 
line RL=0, and declines also to the right of EH on the line RH=0 (the proofs are similar).  
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  We now describe the two possible solutions. First of all, a separating equilibrium 
occurs when UL*>UL**, as depicted in Figure 1. In this equilibrium, firms offer workers the 
pair of contracts (EL,EH), with all low-risk types accepting EL and all high-risk types 
accepting EH. Competition ensures that (EL,EH) is the pair of contracts offered. Because firms 
are risk neutral, in equilibrium they bear all the risk in relation to high-risk types, who are 
fully insured at the point EH. Because of asymmetric information, firms cannot similarly offer 
low-risk types the contract EL′. Firms need instead to identify low-risk types by offering EL, a 
contract with a high wage in the good state and a low benefit in the bad state. EL and EH both 
lie on the indifference curve UH=UH*, so that high-risk types have no incentive to "mimic" 
the behaviour of low-risk types.
5 A pooling equilibrium does not result in Figure 1 because 
UL=UL*, the low-risk type's indifference curve through EL, does not intersect the pooling 
line. In other words, there is no contract on the pooling line that the low-risk types prefer to 
EL. 
  Second of all, a pooling equilibrium occurs when UL*<UL**.  In this equilibrium, as 
depicted in Figure 2, only one contract is offered: contact E. The difference between Figure 2 
and Figure 1 is that UL=UL* now intersects the pooling line. This means that, in comparison 
with the separating contracts (EL,EH), both types now do better at E. Firms can "deviate" 
profitably from (EL,EH), and so (EL,EH) is not the equilibrium. Low-risk types do better at E 
than at EL, although mimicked at E by the high-risk types, and accordingly a pooling 
equilibrium results. 
  (Figure 2 near here) 
 
5 An assumption here is that the high-risk type cannot obtain insurance outside the firm (cannot "top up" with 
insurance), on terms that, starting from EL, allow the high-risk type to attain levels of utility higher than UH*.  
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          In determining whether pooling rather than separation obtains, the magnitude of θ is 
critical. The larger θ, the more likely is pooling. If θ is close to one, so that the pooling line is 
close to RL=0, low-risk types suffer little from being pooled with their high-risk counterparts 
(who are relatively few in number), and low-risk types find separation is not worth its cost in 
the form of low insurance against the bad state.  
  In sum, there are two possible solutions to the model. In the case of a separating 
equilibrium (Figure 1), low-risk types are identified by their choice of contract, namely, a 
high-wage/low-benefit contract. This is an example of "screening" which benefits low-risk 
types even if they face a cost in that they cannot be fully insured. In the case of a pooling 
equilibrium (Figure 2), high-risk types mimic the behaviour of their low-risk counterparts 
and gain in comparison with their full information contract, EH. High-risk types gain by 
pooling. We now proceed to examine the justification for a government mandate in these two 
situations. 
 
III.   Gains in Welfare 
It is clear in our model that, since a firm is free to offer any contract it wishes, no 
government-mandated floor can engineer a Pareto improvement. Rather, competition will 
ensure that opportunities to make workers better off while firms still break even are not 
neglected. The mandate can only restrict the set of contracts on offer, transforming a 
separating equilibrium into a pooling equilibrium (Figure 1), or a pooling equilibrium into a 
pooling equilibrium with a higher level of benefit (Figure 2). In either case, low-risk workers 
are made worse off. In Figure 1 they are better off at EL than at any point on the pooling line; 
and in Figure 2 better off at E than at any different point on the pooling line.  
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  Summers (1989), however, makes the point that unregulated labour markets with 
asymmetric information fail to achieve efficiency across states (which requires workers to be 
fully insured). A mandate can achieve this outcome by imposing as a minimum the benefit 
corresponding to A in Figures 1 and 2, where A is the point where the pooling and full 
insurance lines intersect. Such a mandate may be desirable even though it also has a 
redistributive effect that needs to be taken into account. 
  To formalise the discussion, we adopt a generalisation of Harsanyi's (1977) social 
welfare function due to Blackorby et al. (1997), namely, 
(13)              W = θf(UL) +(1-θ)f(UH).
6
Such a social welfare function may be thought to overstate utilitarian principles at the 
expense of individual rights, which figure so much in recent social choice literature (see for 
example Pattanaik, 1994). But it has the advantage of simplicity and will provide us with 
insights. Varying our previous notation, let (bL,wL) denote the contract accepted by low-risk 
types and (bH,wH) that accepted by high-risk types. Maximising social welfare subject to the 
 
6 An alternative approach that might be considered relies on the concept of a "potential" Pareto improvement. 
(A potential Pareto improvement occurs when "winners" can compensate "losers" and still come out ahead.) 
However, when applying this concept in our context, intransitivities arise. A in Figure 1 is a potential Pareto 
improvement on (EH,EL), since redistribution is possible from A to (EH,EL′) which itself is a Pareto 
improvement on (EH,EL). Thus A is "better" than (EH,EL). On the other hand, redistribution is possible also 
from (EH,EL) back to A, so that (EH,EL) is no worse than A. A second problem with the concept of a potential 
Pareto improvement, in our context, is that winners compensating losers would in practice be impossible. 
When for example A is mandated, forcing pooling, low-risk types cannot be compensated by high-risk types, 
since the latter are not identifiable. Though a popular tool in many contexts, the concept of a potential Pareto 
improvement is not useful here.  
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population, risk, and productivity conditions, the Lagrangean is 
(14)   θ[PLUF(bL)+(1-PL)US(wL)] + (1-θ)[PHUF(bH)+(1-PH)US(wH)] 
  +   λ{θ[PLF+(1-PL)S] + (1-θ)[PHF+(1-PH)S] 
  -   θ[PLbL+(1-PL)wL] - (1-θ)[PHbH+(1-PH)wH]}. 
The first order conditions then give, together with the zero profit condition, 
(15)    UF′(bL) = US′(wL) = UF′(bH) = US′(wH). 
From equations (15), the "first-best" outcome assigns contract A to each worker. (Recall that 
UF′(b)=US′(w) defines the full insurance line.) 
  Thus, given our social welfare function, the government can achieve the first-best 
outcome by mandating full insurance. Mandating A is optimal for two reasons. First, A is on 
the full insurance line and so we have efficiency across states. Second, A is common to all 
workers and so we also have efficiency across workers. The redistribution (neglected by 
Summers) which accompanies the mandate, from low-risk to high-risk workers, is optimal 
because it equalises the marginal utility of income across workers. 
  It is worthwhile analysing the change which a mandate brings about. Starting from 
(EL,EH) in Figure 1 or from E in Figure 2, we may think of movement to A as taking place in 
two steps. There is an initial shift for each type along corresponding "actuarially fair" 
isoprofit lines, which takes them to the full insurance line. This is a Pareto improvement. 
Then there is a second shift for each type, which unites them at A. Define "redistribution" as 
the latter movement. 
  Under (13), redistribution is good because high-risk types are relatively deprived and 
therefore also good "utility generators" (that is, they have a high marginal utility of income). 
An illustration is Summers' example of mandated company health insurance. Here it seems  
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right for the unhealthy to benefit at a minor cost to the healthy. Note, however, that were one 
to introduce moral hazard into the discussion, high-risk types would no longer automatically 
emerge as "deserving". Society might prefer to reward a worker for his or her achievement of 
low risk. 
   It remains that, with homogeneous firms, mandates can improve efficiency across 
worker states, and will have redistributive effects that in many cases are seen as desirable. 
The policy implications are indeed quite striking. Yet, as we shall see, the picture can alter 
quite dramatically once we relax the assumption of identical firms. 
 
IV. Heterogeneous  Firms 
The problem in a nutshell is that enforced pooling may lead to the misallocation of workers 
in a world of heterogeneous firms. As noted earlier, employing high-risk workers creates 
greater difficulties for small than for large firms. To demonstrate that misallocation may 
occur, we replace our assumption, em=e, by em<e. A worker’s product in the bad state is now 
less in the small-firm sector than in the large-firm sector. This implies Fm<F and Sm>S. (Note 
that Sm≤S implies Fm<F, and Fm≥F implies Sm>S, so alternative revenue structures satisfying 
em<e are not consistent with equilibrium. In Section III, given em=e, a similar argument 
justified Fm=F and Sm=S.) Assume there is a separating equilibrium (Figure 3). Intuition 
suggests that efficiency now requires differences in contracts between small and large firms 
so as to bring about an appropriate matching of workers to firms. We explore this. 
  As before, let the separating contracts be (EL,EH), where EL=(bL,wL) and EH=(bH,wH). 
Firms are competitive and cannot make positive profits employing either worker type. Thus, 
(16a)            PLbL + (1-PL)wL  ≥ PLFm + (1-PL)Sm  
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(16b)          PHbH + (1-PH)wH ≥ PHF + (1-PH)S 
(16c)            PLbL + (1-PL)wL  ≥ PLF + (1-PL)S 
(16d)          PHbH + (1-PH)wH ≥ PHFm + (1-PH)Sm. 
  Suppose, hypothetically, that low-risk types work for large firms and high-risk types 
for small firms. We can replace weak inequality in (16c) and (16d) by equality. Substituting 
(16c) into (16a) and (16d) into (16b), and re-arranging, gives 
(17a)          Sm-S  ≤ QL(F-Fm) 
(17b)          Sm-S  ≥ QH(F-Fm). 
Since Sm>S, Fm<F and QH>QL, this is a contradiction. Low-risk types working for large firms 
and high-risk types working for small firms does not occur. 
  We are left with just three possibilities: 
(A)  Only high-risk types work for large firms and only low-risk types for small firms; 
(B)  A mix of low- and high-risk types works for large firms, but only low-risk types for 
small firms; 
(C)  A mix of low- and high-risk types works for small firms, but only high-risk types for 
large firms. 
  Case (B), which seems the most likely, is illustrated in Figure 3. Since both types of 
firm employ low-risk workers, the zero profit line, RL=0, is common to the two types of firm 
and touches the corner of each box. Large firms offer both EL and EH, separating the low-risk 
from the high-risk types. Small firms offer only EL. 
    (Figure 3 near here) 
  We now investigate what happens when pooling replaces separation. In general, 
prices alter, so let the new prices be S' and Sm'.  After pooling, for large firms revenue per  
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worker is S' in the good state and F' =eS' in the bad state; for small firms it is Sm' in the good 
state and Fm' =emSm' in the bad state. New revenues per worker will have the same structure as 
old revenues per worker, that is, Fm'<F' and Sm′>S′. 
A common feature of (A), (B) and (C) is low-risk types work for small firms and 
high-risk types work for large firms, and it follows that weak inequality can be replaced by 
equality in (16a) and (16b). Substituting (16a) into (16c), and (16b) into (16d), gives 
(18a)          Sm-S  ≥ QL(F-Fm) 
(18b)          Sm-S  ≤ QH(F-Fm). 
The break-even relations under pooling are, from (6), 
(19a)               PbP + (1-P)wP = PFm′ + (1-P)Sm′ 
(19b)               PbP + (1-P)wP = PF′ + (1-P)S′. 
Equating the two right hand sides of (19) gives, for pooling, 
(20)                  Sm′-S′ =  Q(F′-Fm′). 
  Recall that the general level of prices is fixed, so when pooling replaces separation 
prices S and Sm vary in opposite directions. We consider the three cases in turn: 
 Case A: Weak inequality can be replaced by strict inequality in (16c) and (16d), and so too 
in (18a) and (18b). Clearly, prices in the large-firm sector may either rise or fall, with 
opposite variation in the small-firm sector; 
Case B: Weak inequality can be replaced by equality in (16c), and so too in (18a). Since 
Q>QL, it follows from (18a) and (20) that prices rise in the large-firm sector and fall in the 
small-firm sector. Intuitively, the effect pooling has on small firms is to worsen the mix of 
workers; 
Case C: Weak inequality can be replaced by equality in (16d), and so too in (18b). Since  
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Q<QH, it follows from (18b) and (20) that prices fall in the large-firm sector and rise in the 
small-firm sector. Intuitively, the effect pooling has on large firms is that costs rise, due to 
workers are no longer being identifiable as high-risk. 
  Diagrammatically in case (B), the (F,S) box contracts and the (Fm,Sm) box expands to 
the point where the pooling line touches the corners of each. The large-firm sector expands 
and the small-firm sector contracts. Under pooling, competition requires the two types of firm 
to have a common pooling line (Figure 3). 
  We now come to an important result we wish to prove, which is that in any of the 
three cases the switch in regime from separation to pooling causes a decline in average 
income. Rigorously, we can show this decline in each of the three cases. First note that, since 
both sectors break even, average income under pooling is PF′+(1-P)S′ = PFm′+(1-P)Sm′. 
Case A: From (16a) and (16d), average income under separation is greater than PFm+(1-P)Sm 
and, from (16b) and (16c), also greater than PF+(1-P)S. Whether S'<S (and so F'<F), or S'>S 
(and so F'>F), average income falls.  
Case B: From (16b) and (16c), average income under separation equals PF+(1-P)S. Since 
average income under pooling is PF′+(1-P)S', and we also know S'<S (and so F'<F), average 
income falls.  
Case C: From (16a) and (16d), average income under separation equals PFm+(1-P)Sm. Since 
average income under pooling is PFm′+(1-P)Sm', and we also know Sm'<Sm (and so Fm'<Fm), 
average income falls. 
  The situation is different where market forces have already resulted in pooling. If 
workers are randomly allocated to begin with, designers of mandates do not have this type of 
misallocation to worry about.  
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  Our discussion suggests that it may be desirable to restrict the coverage of mandates. 
We focus on case (B), which as we have said seems the most likely of the three cases. 
Suppose full insurance is mandated in case (B), but with the mandate restricted to large firms. 
Small firms are free to screen out high-risk types. A curious situation results, which is they 
do so by offering the same contract as large firms. 
  To demonstrate this, let EL be the contract which small firms offer. The contract 
which large firms offer is A, located (as before) where the large-firm pooling line intersects 
the full insurance line (see Figure 4). Recall that the low-risk type's indifference curve 
through A is flatter than the high-risk type's indifference curve through A (an instance of the 
single crossing property). Denote these two indifference curves by UL′ and UH′. The 
argument is simple. Firstly, since low-risk workers work in both sectors, they are indifferent 
between EL and A, so EL lies on UL'; secondly, by the incentive compatibility condition, high-
risk workers too are indifferent between EL and A, so EL lies on UH′. Thus, EL=A. 
  (Figure 4 near here) 
 Although  EL=A, small firms are able to screen out high-risk types. Intuitively, this is 
because they are free to offer a high-wage/low-benefit contract that is attractive to low-risk 
types, but not to high-risk types. Large firms cannot follow suit. The restricted mandate 
benefits small firms, since low-risk types, pooled with high-risk types in large firms, are 
cheaper. There is also no loss of output, since exempted small firms continue to employ only 
low-risk types. Thus, in spite of firm heterogeneity, the restricted mandate avoids 
misallocation of workers. 
  The caveat in all of this is that there may be additional forms of heterogeneity, other 
than the small firm/large firm distinction. Mandates may need to be restricted in further and  
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more complex ways if misallocation is to be avoided. 
 
 
V. Government  Provision 
As an alternative to mandates, governments may themselves provide the fringe benefit 
directly. For expositional convenience, we will analyse such provision in the framework of 
the simpler one-box (em=e) model. Prices are equal (S=Sm), and worker revenue is S in the 
good state and F (=Fm) in the bad state. 
  Suppose the government pays a worker a benefit z in the bad state, so that the 
worker's utility becomes UF(b+z). This provision is financed by a break-even tax of Qz on the 
worker in the good state, so that in the good state the worker's utility is US(w-Qz). (Recall 
that Q=P/(1-P).) Diagrammatically, an increase in government provision shifts the worker 
origin, O, rightward and downward in relation to the revenue box (see Figure 5). 
  We investigate first the effect of varying government provision on E, the low-risk 
worker's preferred contract on the pooling line. Recall that b≥F – the benefit paid by a firm 
cannot be negative. Thus E can be either an interior solution to the left of the firm origin, O′, 
or the corner solution, E=O′. As an interior solution, E is characterised by
7
 
7 Adapting (5) and (8), the Lagrangean for the determination of E is 
 P LUF(b+z) + (1-PL)US(w-Qz) + λ[P(F-b) + (1-P)(S-w)]. 
Differentiating with respect to b and w, and equating to zero, 
(F4)            PLUF′ =  λP 
(F5)        (1-PL)US′ =  λ(1-P). 
Dividing gives (21a). The constraint gives (21b).  
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(21a)           QLUF′(bP+z) =  QUS′(wP-Qz) 
(21b)             wP-Qz  = S - Q(bP+z-F). 
  Equations (21) determine bP+z and wP-Qz uniquely. Thus, when E is an interior 
solution, any variation in government provision of the benefit is exactly offset by a 
compensating variation in firm provision. An increase in z neither affects the total benefit, 
bP+z, nor the net wage, wP-Qz, while worker utilities at E, UL** and UH**, are likewise 
unaffected. Intuitively, the explanation for this result is that E is governed by the low-risk 
type's preferences, and the terms on which the low-risk type obtains additional benefits are 
the same irrespective of whether these are provided by firms or by government. In either 
case, cost is based on average risk. Consequently, as z increases, bP is reduced until 
eventually bP=F. Diagrammatically, E moves toward the revenue box until it coincides with 
the firm origin O′ (Figure 5). Ultimately, if not initially, we arrive at the corner solution, 
E=O′, where the firm provides no benefit. 
  (Figure 5 near here)    
  We can also investigate the effect of varying government provision on the pair of 
separating contracts for high-risk and low-risk workers, EH and EL (as defined in Section II), 
and on worker utilities associated with these contracts. Omitting proofs (which are available 
from the authors on request), the results are: 
(A) At  EH, the utility of high-risk types increases with government provision z, and total 
benefit, bH+z, also increases. The intuitive explanation for this increased utility of high-risk 
types is that they obtain additional benefits on good terms. Although they experience greater 
than average risk of failure, they are taxed at just average risk;  
(B) At  EL, the utility of low-risk types may or may not increase with government  
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provision z, though total benefit, bL+z, will again increase. The redistributive effect in this 
case operates against low-risk types - experiencing lower than average risk of failure, they 
are taxed at average risk. However, there is a further effect. As z increases, low-risk types can 
receive a higher level of benefit without being mimicked by high-risk types and, 
paradoxically, this beneficial effect can more than offset the pure redistributive effect.
8  
  We now draw some conclusions about the effects of direct government provision on 
labour markets. Absent government provision, there can be either pooling or separation, but 
for the sake of argument let us suppose pooling. Figure 6 illustrates. 
  (Figure 6 near here) 
  Equations (21) show that, as z increases from zero, there is at first no net effect on 
workers' benefits, wages, or welfare. But this situation does not persist. At some point, as z 
increases, there occurs a switch in regime from pooling to separation. There has to be 
separation when E reaches E=O′, as low- and high-risk types are both better off with the 
separating contracts, (EL,EH), than with pooling at O′. Each type gains from obtaining 
insurance at a cost that is actuarially fair. Interestingly, as depicted in Figure 6, there may be 
a range within which increases in z achieve Pareto improvements (see (A) and (B) above). 
Beyond this, increases in z, by subsidising high-risk types at the expense of their low-risk 
counterparts, continue to make high-risk types better off, but now penalise low-risk types. 
 
8 This Pareto improvement result is also derived heuristically by Wilson (1977, 200), although he errs in 
claiming that Pareto improvements can always be achieved. A similar effect occurs when a firm, which is 
able to offer more than one contract, uses a profit-making contract aimed at low-risk types to balance a loss-
making contract designed for high-risk types. The advantage gained is that the subsidised high-risk types are 
less inclined to mimic the low-risk types (see Cave, 1984, in the insurance market context).  
 
  23
  We see that government provision has the advantage over a mandate that it is able to 
retain separation, and also convert pooling into separation. Losses, arising under mandates 
due to the misallocation of labour (documented in Section IV), are avoidable with 
government provision. Another advantage is that the taxes which fund government provision 
can be progressive. Taxes are, however, distortionary. These distortions, which are crucial to 
the argument of Summers (1989), fail to appear in our model because of the full employment 
assumption and also by reason of the focused nature of the taxes concerned. Relaxation of 
these assumptions means that distortions would surface. That said, we have demonstrated that 
government provision has certain advantages over mandates ignored in the extant literature. 
 
VI.   Conclusion 
This paper has provided the infrastructure for asymmetric information arguments favouring 
government labour market mandates. We have shown that mandates may improve welfare 
both by redistributing and by overcoming adverse selection. They can bring about an efficient 
allocation of income across worker states, and the accompanying redistribution of income 
across workers will in some instances accord with notions of equity. Mandates may, 
however, also reduce output. Specifically, where worker types are separated in a world of 
heterogeneous firms, mandates may lower productive efficiency, substituting a random 
allocation of labour for the purposive sorting mechanism that in regular markets exploits 
separation. We have reported that targeting may be able in some measure to side step these 
inefficiencies. 
  A further concern of the paper has been the issue of direct provision of the benefit by 
government. It is conventional to argue that mandates dominate government provision  
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because of the greater tax distortions associated with the latter. Yet, we were able to show 
that direct provision can have the advantage of avoiding any misallocation attendant upon 
pooling and the consequent randomisation of labour allocation. Direct provision may thus be 
a more efficient redistributive tool, less costly in its implied output losses. 
  To conclude, our framework has been broad. An important task for the future is to 
identify and parameterise those mandates that fit the mould of adverse selection. We will then 
be able to assess the practical importance of adverse selection, and the redistributive (and 
possible disincentive) effects of mandates. Other issues that may need to be accommodated 
within the existing insurance framework include the availability of external insurance 
(allowing workers to top-up their firm benefits), and cross-subsidisation (even though ruled 
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